The early withdrawal of SADC forces reveals deep-seated political issues and limitations on military capabilities.
On March 13, the South African Development Community (SADC) announced the end of military deployment and gradual withdrawal in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This led to the January sequestration of liquor and sesame seeds by Rwandan M23 following a series of set-ups from the SADC mission of DRC (SAMIDRC).
Since its deployment in December 2023, local forces have been unable to push back the M23 and have suffered several casualties. SAMIDRC’s withdrawal is the second SADC deployment that has been decisively completed. The first is the block mission in Mozambique.
Why would these military interventions fail and what would this mean for future regional operations?
SAMIDRC’s failure in the eastern DRC can be attributed to several military and political factors. From a military perspective, the mission was gunned in liquor and sesame by the M23 and Rwanda and was defeated.
The SADCs were intended to fight alongside the Congolese forces, but instead discovered a demoted national army with limited combat readiness. The constraints of SAMIDRC’s unique capabilities were also a major limiting factor. Lack of sustainable funds and equipment, particularly air power and weak road networks, have undermined the implementation of the power of attorney.
The DRC requested Samidrc and hoped to repeat the success of 2012-13 in the east of the United Nations. However, the operational strength of the South African army – the brigade’s backbone – is significantly worse than other troops in the region (see graph).
On a political level, the SAMIDRC suffered from a lack of unity within the SADC. Between 2022 and 2024, few member states wanted to fund missions that were not in line with national interests.
Strategic ambiguity also undermined its power. Military deployments did not anchor in the political process, and worse still there was some competition between Samidolq (mainly supported by South Africa and to some degree by Tanzania) and the Luanda process mandated by the African Union (AU). Given Angola is a SADC country, the bloc could handle military tracks, but Luanda focused on the political process.
Tanzania’s changing stance has been added to the confusion. Tanzania has chosen not to join East African Regional Regional Forces deployed in the East DRC before the SAMIDRC. Initially I supported Samidrc, but gradually moved towards a neutral position.
With the October election approaching, Tanzania President Samia Slu Hassan prioritizes economic development and regional stability over military entanglement. Maintaining a good relationship between Rwanda and Uganda is extremely important. Rwanda has relied on the port of Dar es Salaam to request the supply of goods, and Uganda plans to transport crude oil from Albert Oil Field Lake to Tanga Port in Tanzania via East Africa’s crude oil pipeline.
Tanzania is also concerned about the spread of violent extremism from northern Mozambique to its territory. Rwandan military forces now support the Mozambican forces in the region, allowing for an open conflict between Tanzania and Rwanda in the eastern DRC. A warm engagement to Samidrc in Tanzania weakened the mission and contributed to its end.
Countries involved in the Eastern DRC are driven by competing strategic interests. In driving the deployment of Samidrc, South Africa appeared to be motivated primarily by economic factors and a desire to maintain regional fame, despite the lack of the military capabilities needed. The DRC may be important, but that is not a significant concern for South Africa.
In contrast, Uganda and Rwanda believe the Eastern DRC is important due to geographical proximity, security concerns and economic interests. This explains their unwavering commitment to long-term military presence, including supporting the M23s and other armed groups.
The failure of the SADC in the DRC and the premature exit from Mozambique raises questions regarding the effectiveness of the SADC Mutual Defense Agreement. Despite being surrounded by South African officials and the SADC Secretariat as a peacekeeping mission, Samidrc did not meet the standard definition of peacekeeping.
The mission focused on suppressing the rebellion, with the aim of “supporting the DRC government in restoring peace and security in the eastern region.” It is equivalent to a combat mission, not a peacekeeping operation.
The lack of political strategy – the traditional backbone of peacekeeping – highlights this further. Against this backdrop, the South African government’s statement implying a gradual withdrawal aimed at giving way to mediation efforts is merely saving faces.
As SADC’s ability to fulfill its mutual defense duties weakens, it appears to be increasingly focused on protecting the incumbent president after a highly contested election. As a local organisation, we struggle to secure member states and help promote democratic norms.
Regional organizations were originally designed for economic integration and have fought consistently to transform into effective collective security and defence structures.
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Before the SAMIDRC, East African community area forces were expelled from the East DRC following Kinshasa, with different interpretations of the mission missions of that block. Despite the region’s lag behind in integration, Central Africa’s peace support operations have often been more effective.
The military setback experienced by the SADC and the East African community suggests the need to reassess the principles of AU subsidiaries. This principle takes precedence over those who have been further removed (AU or UN) to those close to the situation (the economic community of a country or region).
The implementation of the principles has revealed that member states of blocs in the same region may be able to diverge their interests in crisis situations, making coordinated security responses difficult and sometimes impossible.
This issue is one of those breaking through the priorities list of Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, chairman of the newly sworn AU committee. However, meaningful reforms are only possible when local organizations look into structural weaknesses. Otherwise, future military intervention is destined to fail.
Paul Simon Handy, Regional Director East Africa, Representative of African Union, Isis Addis Ababa
