The ground dynamics of the Eastern DRC and the country’s capital test Qatar’s mediation efforts.
On April 23, delegations from Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a political affiliate of Kinshasa and Rebel Group M23, declared their intention to work towards a ceasefire and continue their discussions on the root causes of the Congo Eastern Democratic Republic (DRC) conflict. The truce was mediated by Qatar and negotiations began in March.
The direct consultation between M23 and DRC, which Kinshasa has consistently rejected, is a positive step in the joint declaration. But they unfold against Kinshasa’s increasingly vulnerable political landscape. Because Félix Tshisekedi’s reputation suffers and the opposition is using rebellion to gain political grounds.
The significant territorial expansion of the M23 over the last few months poses a growing threat to the stability of the DRC. After acquiring major cities such as Goma and Bukavu, the rebel groups established parallel management in areas under their control.
Kinshasa also lost most of its external forces’ allies after the withdrawal of South Africa’s Development Community Forces, Burundian Forces and civilian security contractors. The government’s position is now miserable as it relies on local armed groups as its main resistance to the M23.
Throughout the eastern region, unrest is driven by the economic fallout of the war, security gaps, and the increased activity of armed groups such as the Allied democratic troops of the Northern Kivu and militia factions in Ituri and Southern Kivu. The crisis has led to massive displacements of the eastern DRC and its neighbors, particularly Burundi and Uganda, with more than 120,000 Congolese refugees arriving since January.
Complicating the issue is an ambiguous role for local stakeholders. Uganda expanded its military presence in North Kivu and Ituri to address the aggravating unrest and contain the M23. While the forces have stagnated the rebels’ northward advance, it is likely that Uganda is interested in limiting Rwanda’s presence in areas considered Uganda’s influence.
Some local leaders, such as Kenya’s President William Root, have sympathy for the grievances of Rwanda and the M23, while others criticize Rwanda’s support or prefer a more neutral position. Efforts to harmonize the peace process between Luanda and Nairobi have been stagnant, and the Angola-sponsored dialogue has collapsed after the European Union approved the leaders of Rwanda and M23 (including negotiators).
This opened the door to other international actors, including Turkey, which provided mediation support, for example. However, it was a surprising March meeting between the Congo in Doha and the Rwandan president, which revived the negotiation prospects. Qatar is currently hosting peace negotiations that generated the announcement of this week’s ceasefire.
It is not easy to guarantee that a ceasefire will be maintained and lead to a peace agreement. This process is shaped by three factors that drive the power dynamics of the DRC.
The first is the continuous armed mobilization by both sides. To strengthen Kinshasa’s military capabilities, the Tshisekedi administration recruits soldiers from all over the country and supports armed groups under Wazalendo (Swahili “Patriots”) banners.
However, recruitment campaigns do not solve the irregular challenges, chains of orders, poor conditions of service and corruption challenges of the Congolese military. And mobilizing armed groups could backfire as the Wazalendo becomes increasingly fragmented into competing factions.
It is also difficult to neutralize the Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) as some Wazalendo groups worked with the FDLR to embed combatants in the ranks. Many Wazalendo factions have opposed negotiations with the M23, violated previous ceasefire agreements and are accommodating the conditions of the truce, which are difficult for the DRC government.
At the same time, local militias remain the main breakwater against M23 control. This will continue to employ fighter jets with the help of Rwanda. It also promotes the continued expansion of the M23 along with political and economic motivations.
The second factor is political negotiations. The M23 rebellion has affected national level competition for political power, turning border rebellions into a direct challenge to Tshisekedi’s position.
The president is increasingly dependent on political oppression to maintain his grip. To support his support, Tshisekedi released several political prisoners, including opposition leaders and his former right-hand man Jean-Marc Kabund.
He also announced consultations on the government of national unity to face the crisis in the East. However, the opposition largely rejected the plan in favor of a church-led initiative for peace agreements, including the M23.
Some opposition depends on using the M23 rebellion as leverage for a change of government. Former President Joseph Kabila re-emerged as a critic of Tshisekedi’s voice after being kicked out of his power-sharing arrangement in 2020. Former members of the Kabila party have joined the AFC, including South Kivu rebellion governor Manu Barito.
According to reports, Kabila met with AFC leader Corneil Nanger and recently visited Goma, held by the Rebels. During unconfirmed, such speculations highlight how the rebellion became the currency of national-level political negotiations. But despite Tshisekedi’s failure, opposition like Kabila and Nangaa are not reliable alternatives given their own political history and links to corruption.
Both M23/AFC and Kabila are driven primarily by a desire to reintegrate it into the political system rather than reforming it. And as more forces join the rebellion, the M23/AFC could become a field of political competition, and fragment it like the anti-government movements of the past. As such, the AFC acts as a coordination platform rather than a consistent organization and remains intentionally ambiguous on the political agenda.
Current negotiations with the Congolese government test the unity of the M23, as rebel groups need to balance various interests, including individual and foreign sponsors.
The third dimension is extroversion. This means entering into dependency with external state stakeholders to help integrate power. Extraversion has long been part of the conflict landscape of the Eastern DRC. The relationship with the M23’s foreign sponsors will consider negotiations, and competition between Rwanda and Uganda could affect internal rivalries.
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To regain leverage, Tshiseekedi offers access to the vast amount of mineral wealth in the United States (USA) in exchange for security aid. US President Donald Trump has appointed businessman and family member Massad Boulos as special envoy for the region, with a multi-billion dollar contract reportedly underway.
However, this mineral strategy is unlikely to stabilize the eastern DRC. The US prioritizes its own economic benefits, but cuts in humanitarian aid — covering more than 70% of the DRC’s relief funds — limits the benefits of the new partnership.
As evacuation and food insecurity in the eastern DRC surge, peace negotiations must focus on an emergency ceasefire. There is then an agreement to resume trade routes, establish humanitarian corridors and secure key areas.
You also need to learn the lessons from past experiences. The 2002 Sun City Agreement was only possible after the comprehensive ceasefire agreement and the withdrawal of foreign troops. A similar roadmap is needed now.
Ultimately, a comprehensive, Congo-led process is essential to addressing the underlying causes of conflict. But too often in DRC, powersharing is over itself and promotes violence and conflict. Peace negotiations should avoid making similar mistakes.
Bram Verelst, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention, Management, Peacebuilding, ISS Nairobi
