Protecting the president requires multiple layers of intelligence, physical security, and quick response security protocols. Although precise operational details are categorized, VIP protection has global best practices.
The issue of presidential protection in Kenya has become particularly relevant after the incident in early May 2025 when someone in the crowd threw a shoe and smashed his hand at President William Root during a public event.
I have been studying police and security policies in Kenya for over 15 years and have been in close dialogue with the country’s security protocols. In my view, this incident lost some important security around elite officers tasked with protecting the president.
The security of the president is a key issue in Kenya. The country is exposed to terrorist groups such as Somalia-based Al-Shabaab and other criminal networks in the region.
In 2021, a businessman embed himself in the president’s car, driving him to the official home of Uhuru Kenyatta at the time. In 2017, an unidentified man who was allegedly illegally accessed the highly protected state capitol grounds was shot dead by a presidential guard.
Kenya’s protection protocols have multiple layers. They include National Intelligence Services Officers, the Kenyan National Defence Force, Presidential Escort Police Officers drawn from highly trained General Services Units, bomb disposal specialists and regular police officers. Their developments depend on the nature of the president’s involvement.
The shoe incident may seem simply embarrassing, but it should serve as a wake-up call to close security protocols around the president without necessarily compromising public engagement with the citizens.
What’s appropriate
Before a national presidential visit, security teams conduct thorough reconnaissance of their destinations. This includes coordination with local policing agencies, clearing airspace, mapping safe transport routes, and identifying nearby medical facilities in the event of an emergency.
The president’s motor vehicle route is planned in advance and there will be a dry run. This includes mapping of alternative routes to avoid predictability when there is an assailant along the presidential route. It is common to see some roads temporarily closed and security personnel clearing out threats and explosives. In areas that are considered high risk, counter security sniper teams are secretly deployed in strategic areas.
In Kenya, cases of presidential attacks on cars are rare. However, during the 2002 presidential election, angry opposition supporters later threw President Daniel Moy’s motor card. In November 2021, an angry mob threw rocks at the motorcade of then-President Ruto.
The National Intelligence Service and the Presidential Escort forces will secretly scout beforehand and assess potential security vulnerabilities. The size of the head of state crowd and exit and exit points are mapped in advance.
When meetings are held at city halls or huge tents, attendees will be screened using metal detectors and/or physical searches. The mediocre security guards in uniform were embedded in the crowd to monitor the threat.
The president and the senior officials accompanying him have at least three levels of security.
The inner ring consists of close protective personnel who are always within the length of the president’s arm to physically stop the threat. The middle ring is armed guards, among other things, watching for sudden and unusual movements in the crowd. The outer ring consists of regular police and paramilitary units from general services units that protect the outer boundary.
The President’s automobile is a coordinated convoy of heavy armored vehicles. This includes lead cars and chase cars, communications units and emergency response teams. Traffic is managed by local traffic police officers to ensure unobstructed movement. The route will remain confidential until needed.
Presidential security may choose to use decoy cars to confuse and derail potential sources of risk when there is a security threat. In all these cases there is always a requirement for officers of a professional general service unit called the Lecco unit, which is always accompanied by the President.
The security precautions of the Kenyan president follow standard VIP security protections, such as heads of state around the world. But, for example, in some neighbouring countries, the president moves to heavily armed military convoys. This is not seen in Kenya.
If a potential threat is detected, the president is immediately protected, foamed into a safe vehicle or evacuated by air at high-risk events. In such cases, the Kenyan Defense Forces will secure a president.
Despite strict security measures, incidents can occur. For example, in March 2025, a British tourist was fatally hit by a vehicle on the route. This prompted research and review of motorcade safety protocols.
These events underscore the challenges of balancing presidential safety with public safety, especially in urban areas with a large population.
Security Failure
The shoe throwing incident targeting RUTO highlighted five major failures in the Presidential Protection Protocol.
First, impaired crowd screening and access control. The suspect is very close to the president, suggesting an inadequate distance between the crowd and the president. Also, the inner ring of security could not find the assailant raising his shoes in the air to use as a projectile. This shows that the front row eye sweep and scans are weak due to presidential security.
Secondly, there was a clear delay in security response. Elite officers around the president should have stifled the suspected attacker within seconds. That could mean that most people were looking to the president or camera, rather than scanning the crowd for sudden movements.
Third, security allowed the president to get too close to unscreened crowds. Best practices require a 3-5m no-go zone for individuals who have not been scanned or screened.
Fourth, there was a clear gap between intelligence and threat assessment. The offensive or excited people next to the president should attract the attention of security guards. Plaincross security personnel are usually deployed to monitor crowd behavior. It’s not enough to rely on a uniformed officer.
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Undercover agents are important for flagging pre-attack signals, such as tension and repeated position adjustments.
Fifth, there was no clear evacuation plan for the President. After the incident, the president continued to speak. In high-risk scenarios, the protocol often calls for the immediate relocation of the president to a secure vehicle or helicopter that the military takes over him and safely airs.
What should I change
Details of the Kenya president’s security may be forced to:
More frequent security risks are put in place to increase the standoff distance between the president and crowd, deploy more plain clinical officers, fuse more stringent screenings of people close to the president, monitor crowds, and quickly neutralize potential threats.
The exact details of Kenya’s presidential security are confidential. However, the comprehensive structure aims to provide comprehensive protection to the President while maintaining public safety and order during official engagements. Security protocols are not 100% certain. But there’s a need to balance between overly aggressive crowd control and accessibility.
Douglas Lucas Kiboy, Principal Policy Analyst, Governance Department, Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)
