A long-term maritime agreement can enhance Somalia’s naval capabilities and curb illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
Somalia loses about US$300 million a year to illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing in its vast waters. It boasts Africa’s longest coastline – about 3,333 km along the North Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden – the country’s oceans are extremely advantageous in both legal and illegal fishing operations.
Weak governance, political instability, and the lack of effective law enforcement exacerbate the problems of illegal fishing. To address this, Türkiye and Somalia signed a memorandum in February 2024, establishing the Turkish military as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next 10 years.
Most illegal fishing in Somalia is carried out by foreign fishing vessels from countries such as China, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan, Spain and other European countries. A Mogadishu-based researcher who requested anonymity said that operators of some foreign ships illegally obtained fishing licenses.
“There’s no way to know how much fish was consumed because the government rarely reports it,” he said. “They process fish and export them to international markets.”
However, the problem is approaching their homes, with some federal members such as Pantoland and Somaliland issued their own licenses without consulting the Somali government.
In the early 2000s, domestic stocks were almost depleted by illegal fishing, making hundreds of Somali fishermen extremely dangerous but advantageous pirates to “protect” the country’s resources and support the threatened livelihood.
Intervention by multinational naval forces helped to eliminate the threat to Somali coastal waters. However, the security was destroyed when signs of a potential revival appeared in 2024, and was partly linked to a Houthi attack on vessels in the Red Sea.
In 2011, then-Türkiye Prime Minister, President Recept Erdogan, visited Somalia for a historic visit to Somalia and reopened the embassy in the capital Mogadishu. The ongoing relationship was a game-changer in Somali, with Türkiye embarking on an ambitious long-term investment plan, while the rest of the world shunning war-torn countries.
Türkiye provided the largest international aid in 2011, in the wake of a severe drought in Somalia, investing more than US$100 million in the country’s economy. These investments span specialized combat training schools, hospitals, educational institutions and local government services.
More recently, Türkiye has invested in the exploration and extraction of vast hydrocarbon deposits from Somalia’s long coastline. Turkey’s soft power, supported by its cultural, historical and religious affinity with the majority of Muslim countries, appears to be rewarded.
Under the terms of the latest deal between the two countries, Somalia will outsource the protection of territorial water and marine resources to Türkiye for the next decade. Türkiye will strengthen Somalia’s maritime safety capabilities through training, collaboration, information sharing and naval acquisitions.
The Maritime Agreement is expected to provide Somali naval forces with the reconstruction, equipment and training necessary to monitor and control the rise of illegal fishing in its waters. In return, Türkiye should receive 30% of revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone and management of gas and oil exploration. Estimates show that Somalia has 30 billion barrels of oil and gas potential.
It is not clear how this transaction will affect the semi-autonomous region of Pantland and BreakAway Somaliland, which has similar arrangements to the authority of other regions.
Türkiye has a strong track record in building capacity in the Somali security sector. This includes training elite units, establishing Camp Turksom (Turkey military base), selling unmanned aerial vehicles in Somalia, operating major airports and ports in Mogadishu, and participating in counterterrorist bombings against Al-Shabah.
In other words, Türkiye’s promise to build Somali naval capabilities probably means fruitful – controlling its maritime zones, arresting illegal ships, suppressing toxicity abandonment, and increasing its ability to work with Türkiye’s navy to curb piracy.
However, challenges still exist. The memorandum signed between Inland Ethiopia and Somaliland in the beginning of 2024 can complicate the equation. The exact terms of the contract are unknown, but in exchange for the recognition of Ethiopia’s Somaliland, Ethiopia will acquire sea access and military bases in the Aden Strategic Gulf.
Somalia initially deemed this a violation of sovereignty and requested Addis Ababa to cancel the transaction. In December 2024, Türkiye promoted a conference between Somalia and Ethiopia, resulting in the Ankara Declaration eased tensions between the two countries over access to the sea.
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However, if Somalia seeks to extend its jurisdiction over Somaliland’s exclusive economic zone, the Türkiye-Somalia Maritime Cooperation Agreement could exacerbate tensions.
Somalia was a place of intense competition between strong countries, including the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar, the UK and China. Many of these states invest in ports, health and education, counter-terrorism, support for the security sector’s capacity and infrastructure development.
These countries may not be impressed by the increased exclusive access that Somalia has given to Churkiye. The Somali Churkiye contract can be plagued by withdrawing or reducing critical security sectors and development support. This slows down the pace of Somalia’s recovery.
Complex balancing acts are needed to focus Türkiye on focusing on restraining illegal fishing while Somalia reconstructs a more peaceful future with its neighbors and other international partners.
This article was first published by Enact.
Samira Aden Abdi, Head of Research at East Africa Regional Organized Crime Observatory, Entert, Isarobi
Halkano Wario, East Africa Regional Organized Crime Observatory, Enact, ISS Nairobi
